The revised moA introduces principles of cooperation which are the Commission`s main authority with regard to the review of mergers and the detection and examination of prohibited practices. The MoA also defines ICAO`s primary authority to define, as appropriate, conditions within the sector and to promote competition with respect to existing legislation (e.g. .B. icasa Act, 2000, electronic communication act, 2005 and postal services act, 1998). It also expressly provides for the jurisdiction of the Competition Court for complaints addressed to the Commission and designates the officials of the authorities concerned as interlocutors for the purposes of the agreement. The new MoA replaces the MoA, previously closed between the two regulators in 2002, which has been criticised for failing to establish a coherent legal framework for merger assessment, market research and the role of the respective regulators. Among the questions raised by the lack of certainty about simultaneous jurisdiction are: telecommunications have been made available and regulated by a parastatal monopoly, the South African Post and Telecommunications (SAPT). In the late 1980s, certain aspects of the telecommunications market were liberalized. The Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) and Value-added Network Service (VANS) markets have been opened to competition. On 1 November 27, 2016, Mr Rubben Mohlaloga, then ICAO`s current President, confirmed at a meeting before the Portfolio Committee for Communications that “[the CCC] is a committee of the Board and not an independent board. Therefore, although ICAO ultimately makes a decision, the CAB makes recommendations to the Council. ICASA inherited a number of satra challenges, including: – On 29 August 2019, at the 13th Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Politics, a signing ceremony was held between the Commission and the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (“ICAO”).
The MoA could help to exploit the complementary functions between the two authorities (i.e. the expertise of the sectoral regulatory authority on the one hand and the competitive knowledge of the competition authority on the other) and to ensure optimal regulatory outcomes. Paragraph 4 of Section 4 expressly authorizes the Council to delegate to a committee all the powers, functions or obligations of ICAO, under certain conditions and with the explicit exclusions provided for in this Section and Section 17. However, it also provides that, “notwithstanding” the creation of a committee with delegated powers, “the Council shall exercise general control over the exercise of the powers and the performance of the functions of the Authority within the meaning of this Act”. With respect to the CAB, its “judgments” are findings that become recommendations to ICASA, which the Commission may consider and accept or reject in its own decision. . . .